Aksjonærrettigheter under press
Vårt synspunkt om hvorfor markedsaktører bør samarbeide om å beskytte aksjonærrettigheter.
Vårt synspunkt om hvorfor markedsaktører bør samarbeide om å beskytte aksjonærrettigheter.
Av Carine Smith Ihenacho, Chief Governance and Compliance Officer; Snorre Gjerde, Policy Lead; Deena Elmeged, Senior Investment Stewardship Manager.
Resten av synspunktet er tilgjengelig på engelsk.
Across many markets, competition for listings has led to changes to the frameworks that protect minority shareholders. Some changes reflect legitimate improvements, but others weaken the investor protections that anchor market confidence and integrity. In global markets, changes in some jurisdictions create pressure on others to follow. This trend is concerning and can affect long-term value creation across global portfolios.
Research indicates that robust shareholder rights are associated with deeper more liquid capital markets and broader access to financing,[1] that weakening these rights can raise companies' cost of capital,[2] and that companies with stronger shareholder protections have historically traded at higher valuation multiples.[3]
Robust shareholder rights give long-term investors confidence to remain invested through volatile periods when short-term funding withdraws, supporting steady allocation of investment to its most productive use. The benefits of strong shareholder rights extend beyond shareholders to savers and pensioners, workers whose employers rely on financing, entrepreneurs raising money for new ideas, and economies that prosper when markets function well.
Norges Bank Investment Management is a minority shareholder in more than 7,000 listed companies globally. Our objective is to deliver the highest possible long-term returns for future generations. This goal depends on well-functioning markets, where shareholders have meaningful rights.
We consider the following to be important pillars of shareholder rights that support well-functioning public equity markets:[4]
Together, the actions of key market stakeholders shape and maintain shareholder rights. Each depends on the market integrity that these rights sustain, and all should take steps to protect them.
Regulators administer important elements of the frameworks under which shareholder rights are exercised. A consistent approach by regulators is itself a form of investor protection, as sudden changes to settled rules can create uncertainty and impede shareholders from exercising their rights.
Stock exchanges are a crucial part of market infrastructure, setting the governance standards companies must meet to list. Competition for listings can create pressure to lower those standards. Holding the line, including for newly public companies, protects the integrity of the market.
Index providers aim to represent investable markets, but their inclusion rules also shape the standards companies must meet, and the governance features that index-tracking investors are exposed to. Given the scale of index-tracking today, how providers set these rules, and the weight they give to governance standards in doing so, matters for investor protection at scale.
Companies and their boards are entrusted with investors' capital. This means communicating transparently and preserving shareholder rights through their choice of governance arrangements, place of incorporation and listing venue.
Investors promote effective governance by exercising their rights thoughtfully, and by contributing to market-wide efforts to protect them. As responsible stewards, they have an interest in ensuring strong protections are maintained.
Given the concerning changes, we will:
[1] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). Legal determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131; La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2006). What works in securities laws? Journal of Finance, 61(1), 1.
[2] Houston, J.F., Lin, C., & Xie, W. (2018). Shareholder protection and the cost of capital. Journal of Law and Economics, 61(4), 677.
[3] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002). Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1147; Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 107.
[4] See G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2023), for a comprehensive, complete and internationally recognised framework of shareholder rights.
[5] OECD (2026), Flexibility and investor protection in share class structures, OECD Publishing, Paris.
[6] See also See NBIM position paper: Multiple share classes
[7] See also NBIM position papers: Related-party transactions and Shareholder rights in equity issuances