Management proposals |
1
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Accept Financial Statements and Statutory Reports for Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2021
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For
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For
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2
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Approve Allocation of Income and Dividends
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For
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For
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3
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Do You Wish to Adopt Cumulative Voting for the Election of the Members of the Board of Directors, Under the Terms of Article 141 of the Brazilian Corporate Law?
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None
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Abstain
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4.1
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Elect Andre Santos Esteves as Director
Vote rationale:
The board should guide company strategy and monitor management performance without conflicts of interest. A majority of shareholder-elected board members in a non-controlled company should be independent of management, dominant shareholders, and related third parties. In a majority-controlled company, at least a third of board members should be independent.
Global Voting Guidelines
Board independence
Vote rationale:
Shareholders should have the right to seek changes to the board when it does not act in their best interest. We will consider whether the board has failed to act on material requests from shareholders, sought to circumvent shareholder proposals or implemented governance changes limiting shareholders’ rights without their approval. When voting on a proposal to discharge the board of responsibilities, we will consider whether any information raises reasonable doubt about the board’s actions. We will also take into considerations unsatisfactory financial and strategic performance, mismanaged risk-taking, unacceptable treatment of stakeholders or undesired environmental or social outcomes from company operations.
Global Voting Guidelines
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For
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Against
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4.2
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Elect John Huw Gwili Jenkins as Director
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For
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For
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4.3
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Elect Joao Marcello Dantas Leite as Director
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For
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For
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4.4
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Elect Nelson Azevedo Jobim as Director
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For
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For
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4.5
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Elect Roberto Balls Sallouti as Director
Vote rationale:
Board decisions that are particularly vulnerable to conflicts of interest should have additional safeguards. Management should not serve on the audit or remuneration committees. The audit committee should have a majority of independent, shareholder-elected members.
Global Voting Guidelines
Board independence
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For
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Against
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4.6
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Elect Mark Clifford Maletz as Independent Director
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For
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For
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4.7
|
Elect Guillermo Ortiz Martinez as Director
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For
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For
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4.8
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Elect Eduardo Henrique de Mello Motta Loyo as Independent Director
Vote rationale:
Board decisions that are particularly vulnerable to conflicts of interest should have additional safeguards. Management should not serve on the audit or remuneration committees. The audit committee should have a majority of independent, shareholder-elected members.
Global Voting Guidelines
Board independence
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For
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Against
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4.9
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Elect Sofia de Fatima Esteves as Independent Director
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For
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For
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5
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In Case Cumulative Voting Is Adopted, Do You Wish to Equally Distribute Your Votes Amongst the Nominees below?
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None
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Abstain
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6.1
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Percentage of Votes to Be Assigned - Elect Andre Santos Esteves as Director
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None
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Abstain
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6.2
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Percentage of Votes to Be Assigned - Elect John Huw Gwili Jenkins as Director
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None
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Abstain
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6.3
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Percentage of Votes to Be Assigned - Elect Joao Marcello Dantas Leite as Director
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None
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Abstain
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6.4
|
Percentage of Votes to Be Assigned - Elect Nelson Azevedo Jobim as Director
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None
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Abstain
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6.5
|
Percentage of Votes to Be Assigned - Elect Roberto Balls Sallouti as Director
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None
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Abstain
|
6.6
|
Percentage of Votes to Be Assigned - Elect Mark Clifford Maletz as Independent Director
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None
|
Abstain
|
6.7
|
Percentage of Votes to Be Assigned - Elect Guillermo Ortiz Martinez as Director
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None
|
Abstain
|
6.8
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Percentage of Votes to Be Assigned - Elect Eduardo Henrique de Mello Motta Loyo as Independent Director
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None
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Abstain
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6.9
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Percentage of Votes to Be Assigned - Elect Sofia de Fatima Esteves as Independent Director
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None
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Abstain
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7
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As an Ordinary Shareholder, Would You like to Request a Separate Minority Election of a Member of the Board of Directors, Under the Terms of Article 141 of the Brazilian Corporate Law?
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None
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Abstain
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8
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As a Preferred Shareholder, Would You like to Request a Separate Minority Election of a Member of the Board of Directors, Under the Terms of Article 141 of the Brazilian Corporate Law?
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None
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Abstain
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9
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Approve Remuneration of Company's Management
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For
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For
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10
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Do You Wish to Request Installation of a Fiscal Council, Under the Terms of Article 161 of the Brazilian Corporate Law?
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None
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Abstain
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11
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In Case Neither Class of Shares Reaches the Minimum Quorum Required by the Brazilian Corporate Law to Elect a Board Representative in Separate Elections, Would You Like to Use Your Votes to Elect the Candidate with More Votes to Represent Both Classes?
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None
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For
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